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ABSTRACT
There is growing concern about how personal data are used when
users grant applications direct access to the sensors of their mobile
devices. In fact, high resolution temporal data generated by mo-
tion sensors reflect directly the activities of a user and indirectly
physical and demographic attributes. In this paper, we propose a
feature learning architecture for mobile devices that provides flex-
ible and negotiable privacy-preserving sensor data transmission
by appropriately transforming raw sensor data. The objective is to
move from the current binary setting of granting or not permis-
sion to an application, toward a model that allows users to grant
each application permission over a limited range of inferences ac-
cording to the provided services. The internal structure of each
component of the proposed architecture can be flexibly changed
and the trade-off between privacy and utility can be negotiated
between the constraints of the user and the underlying application.
We validated the proposed architecture in an activity recognition
application using two real-world datasets, with the objective of
recognizing an activity without disclosing gender as an example
of private information. Results show that the proposed framework
maintains the usefulness of the transformed data for activity recog-
nition, with an average loss of only around three percentage points,
while reducing the possibility of gender classification to around
50%, the target random guess, from more than 90% when using raw
sensor data. We also present and distribute MotionSense, a new
dataset for activity and attribute recognition collected from motion
sensors.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Smartphones and wearable devices are equipped with sensors such
as accelerometers, gyroscope, barometer and light sensors that are
directly accessed by applications (apps) to provide through a cloud
service analysis and statistics about, for example, the activities of
the user. However, by granting to these apps access to raw sensor
data, users may unintentionally reveal information about gender,
mood, personality, which is unnecessary for the specific services.
To address this problem, we introduce the Guardian-Estimator-
Neutralizer (GEN) framework that, instead of granting apps direct
access to sensors, is designed to share only a transformed version
of the sensor data, based on the functions and requirements of
each application and privacy considerations. The Guardian pro-
vides an inference-specific transformation, the Estimator guides the
Guardian by estimating sensitive and non-sensitive information in
the transformed data, and the Neutralizer is an optimizer that helps
the Guardian converge to a near-optimal transformation function
(see Figure 1).
Unlike privacy-preserving works that only hide users’ identity
by sharing population data using generative models for data syn-
thesis [2, 9], our solution concerns sensitive information included
in a single user’s data. There are, however, some methods which
transform only selected temporal sections of sensor data that cor-
respond to predefined sensitive activities [11, 12], our framework
enables concurrently eliminating private information from each
section of data, while keeping the utility of shared data.
GEN is a feature learning and data reconstruction framework that
helps to efficiently establish a trade-off between apps utility and user
privacy. Specifically, in this paper, we instantiate the framework
for an activity recognition application based on data recorded by
the accelerometer and gyroscope of a smartphone. In the context
of this application, we categorize information that can be inferred
from sensor data into two types: information about a predefined set
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Figure 1: GEN Architecture: First, the Estimator is trained;
then the Guardian is trained using the Estimator with the
help of the Neutralizer.
of activities of the user (non-sensitive inferences) and information
about attributes of the user such as gender, age, weight and height
(sensitive inferences).
Our goal is to establish a tradeoff between the ability of the
apps to accurately infer non-sensitive information to maximize
their utility and the reduction of revealed sensitive information to
minimize the risk of privacy infringement. We show that GEN can
accurately maintain the usefulness of the released (transformed)
data for activity recognition while considerably reducing the risk
of attribute recognition.1
2 PROBLEM DEFINITION
Let X (t) = (X1(t),X2(t), . . . ,Xm (t)) be the recorded values of the
m sensor-data components during a collection period of duration
T , where t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T }. We assume the data to be synchronized
and collected at the same frequency.
Let us consider a running window of duration d that contains
consecutive values of X (t) from time t to t + d − 1. Let Sd (t) be the
corresponding section of the time-series:
Sd (t) = X [t , t + d − 1] =
(
X (t),X (t + 1), . . . ,X (t + d − 1)
)
,
where the value ofd should be chosen such that the runningwindow
be large enough for making desired inferences by apps. However,
in order to be computationally effective, it should not be chosen
very large. For simplicity, we remove the index t , from Sd (t), in the
following.
We define two types of inference on each Sd : inference of sensitive
information, Is(.), and inference of non-sensitive information, In(.).
Our goal is to find a transformation function, G∗(.), in a way that
the transformed data Sˆ∗d = G∗(Sd ) are such that Is(Sˆ∗d ) fails to reveal
private information, whereas In(Sˆ∗d ) generates inferences that are
1The code and data used in this paper are publicly available at:
https://github.com/mmalekzadeh/motion-sense
Figure 2: An instantiation of GEN for activity recognition
from sensor data without revealing the gender information.
The Guardian is an autoencoder. The Estimator is a multi-
task ConvNet.
as accurate as In(Sd ). Here, Sˆd is the transformation of correspond-
ing Sd , and Sˆ∗d is its optimal privacy-preserving transformation.
3 LEARNING THE INFERENCE-SPECIFIC
TRANSFORMATION
We present the proposed framework that includes three compo-
nents: the Guardian, the Estimator, and the Neutralizer (Figure 1),
and discuss its instantiation for an activity recognition applica-
tion (Figure 2).
The Guardian, which provides inference-specific transformation,
is a feature learning framework that recognizes and distinguishes
discerning features from data. In the specific implementation of this
paper, we use a deep autoencoder [16] as Guardian. An autoencoder
is a neural network that tries to reconstruct its input based on an
objective function. Here, the autoencoder receives a section of m-
dimensional time-series with length of d as input, and produces a
time-series with the same dimensionality as the output; based on
the Neutralizer’s objective function, which is described below.
The Estimator quantifies how accurate an algorithm can be at
making sensitive and non-sensitive inferences on the transformed
data. In the specific implementation of this paper, we use a multi-
task convolutional neural network (MTCNN) as Estimator [17]. The
shape of input is similar to the Guardian and the shape of output
depends on the number of activity classes. MTCNN has the ability
to share learned representations from input between several tasks.
More precisely, we try to simultaneously optimize a CNN with two
types of loss function, one for sensitive inferences and another for
non-sensitive ones. Consequently, MTCNN will learn more generic
features, which should be used for several tasks, at its earlier layers.
Then, subsequent layers, which become progressively more spe-
cific to the details of the desired task, can be divided into multiple
branches, each for a specific task.
The Neutralizer, the most important contribution of this paper,
is an optimizer that helps the Guardian find the optimal G∗(·) for
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MobiAct MotionSense
#Males 32 14
#Females 16 10
#Features (m) 9 12
SampleRate (Hz) 20 50
Table 1: Details of the MobiAct and MotionSense datasets.
transforming each section Sd into Sˆ∗d using as objective
G∗(.) = argmin
G(.)∈F
(
p
(
Is
(G(Sd )) ) − p (In (G(Sd )) )),
where p
(
Is (·)
)
and p
(
In (·)
)
are the probabilities of making sensitive
and non-sensitive inferences, respectively, and the F is the set of all
possible transformation functions for the Guardian. In the specific
application of this paper the Neutralizer is a multi-task objective
function used by backpropagation to update the weights of the
Guardian (autoencoder). The F is also the set of all possible weight
matrices for the selected autoencoder.
Particularly, we aim to transform each section Sd such that we
can recognize an activity from Sˆd without revealing the gender of
the user. For each section Sd , let Ya(Sd ) and Ya(Sˆd ) be the true and
predicted class of activity, respectively, and Yg(Sˆd ) be the predicted
gender class. We define the Neutralizer’s objective function as
Sˆ∗d = argmin
Sˆd
(
| (0.5 − Yg(Sˆd )) | −
c∑
i=1
−Y ia(Sd ) logY ia(Sˆd )
)
, (1)
where c is the number of activity classes. In the r.h.s. of the equation,
the first part is our custom gender-neutralizer loss function and
the second part is a categorical cross entropy. The constant 0.5 is
the desired confidence for a gender predictor that will process the
transformed data.
4 EXPERIMENTS
We validate the proposed framework on recognizing the following
activities from smartphone motion sensors: Downstairs, Upstairs,
Walking, Jogging. The non-sensitive inferences, In, is the recog-
nition of the activities, whereas the sensitive inference, Is, is the
recognition of gender.
We aim to measure the trade-off between the utility of data for
activity recognition and privacy, e.g. keeping gender secret. To
this end, we first compare the accuracy of activity recognition and
gender classification when a trained MTCNN has access to original
data and to the corresponding transformed data. Then we try to
measure the amount of sensitive information which is still available
in the transformed data using different methods.
Model Layer (Neurons | Kernel | Chance)
Inp(m,d)
Conv(50: 1 × 5); Conv(50: 1 × 3)
Dense(50); MP(1 × 2); DO(0.2)
Conv(40: 1 × 5)
MTCNN Dense(40); MP(1 × 3); DO(0.2)
Conv(20: 1 × 3); DO(0.2)
Flatten; Dense(400); DO(0.4)
OutA = Softmax(4); OutG = Sigmoid
Inp(|x |); Dense(|x |/2); Dense(|x |/4)
AE Dense(|x |/8)
Dense(|x |/4); Dense(|x |/2); Out(|x |)
Table 2: Structure of the hidden layers. The activation func-
tion for all the layers is “ReLU”. Key – MP: MaxPooling; DO:
DropOut; |x | =m × d .
4.1 Datasets
We use two real-world datasets: MobiAct2 and MotionSense3. The
latter dataset is one of the contributions of this paper.
MobiAct [15] includes accelerometer, gyroscope and orienta-
tion data (m = 9) from a smartphone collected when data subjects
performed 9 activities in 16 trials. A total of 67 participants in a
range of gender, age, weight, and height collected the data with
a Samsung Galaxy S3 smartphone (we use a subset of 48 subjects
who have no missing data). Unlike other datasets, which require
the smartphone to be rigidly placed on the human body and with
a specific orientation, MobiAct attempted to simulate every-day
usage of mobile phones where a smartphone is located with random
orientation in a loose pocket chosen by the subject (Table 1).
MotionSense includes the accelerometer (acceleration and grav-
ity), attitude (pitch, roll, yaw) and gyroscope data (m = 12) collected
with an iPhone 6s kept in the participant’s front pocket using Sens-
ingKit [10]. A total of 24 participants in a range of gender, age,
weight, and height performed 6 activities in 15 trials in the same
environment and conditions: downstairs, upstairs, walking, jogging,
sitting, and standing. With this dataset, we aim to look for personal
attributes fingerprints in time-series of sensor data, i.e. attribute-
specific patterns that can be used to infer physical and demographic
attributes of the data subjects in addition to their activities.
See http:github.com/mmalekzadeh/motion-sense for details on
the methodology and the data (Table 1).
2publicly available at:
http://www.bmi.teicrete.gr/index.php/research/mobiact
3publicly available at:
http://github.com/mmalekzadeh/motion-sense
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Setting Dataset Inf. Sd Sˆd
Trial
MotionSense
Ia 95.08 93.71
Ig 95.15 49.32
MobiAct
Ia 94.31 90.46
Ig 93.74 49.83
Subject
MotionSense
Ia 86.33 85.19
Ig 75.35 52.16
MobiAct
Ia 70.49 65.01
Ig 66.18 45.54
Table 3: Activity recognition, Ia, and gender classification, Ig,
accuracy for original, Sd , and transformed, Sˆd , data in per-
cent (%).
4.2 Experimental Setup
For each dataset, we consider two types of setting, namely Trial and
Subject. In Trial, we keep 2/3 of trials for training and 1/3 of them
for testing. For example, if there are 3 walking trials per participant,
we keep the first two trials for training and the last one for testing.
In Subject we keep data of 75% of all subjects for training and the
data of remaining 25% subjects for testing. In the Subject setting,
we report the average results of four selections for test dataset.
We train an MTCNN as the Estimator by considering two tasks:
(i) activity recognition (4 classes) with categorical cross-entropy loss
function [4], and (ii) gender classification (2 classes) with binary
cross-entropy loss function. [4]. After training MTCNN, we freeze
the weights of the MTCNN layers and attach the output of a deep
autoencoder (AE) as the Guardian to the input of the MTCNN to
build the GEN neural network. Finally, we compile GEN and set
its loss function equals to the objective function of the Neutralizer
in Equation (1). The deep network architectures are described in
Table 2.
4.3 Transformation Efficiency
Table 3 shows that the Guardian produces time-series that keep
the utility of non-sensitive inferences at a comparable level to the
original ones (the average loss is three percentage points) while
preventing sensitive inferences, as the gender classification accu-
racy decreases from more than 90% to near the target random guess
(50%).
Cross-Dataset Validation. We also validate GEN in an ecosys-
tem where edge users benefit from pre-trained models of a service
provider. At the cloud side the Estimator (MTCNN) is trained on
a public dataset, the MobiAct dataset in our case. At the edge side,
the Guardian receives the trained Estimator and uses its locally
(personally) defined Neutralizer to transform the user’s data, the
MotionSense dataset in our case.
The results show that the accuracy of the Estimator on raw
data for Ia and Iд are 93.67% and 92.80%, respectively; whereas on
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0
20
40
60
80
100
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
E
rr
or
(%
)
Original Data Transformed Data
Figure 3: Error for gender is “classification error” and for
the rest of attributes is “mean absolute error”. All the val-
ues are divided by the error of a random estimator on the
MotionSense dataset.
transformed data are 90.92% and 51.93%, respectively. This shows
an interesting property of GEN which makes it more applicable to
deploy in edge devices.
The only concern here is whether users trust the pre-trained
Estimator received from an untrusted service provider. User can
verify the Estimator by running it on a publicly available dataset.
We leave more investigation on this concern for future work.
4.4 Measuring Information Leakage
We aim to experimentally quantify the amount of information about
user’s attributes that is still available in the transformed data.
Using Dynamic Time Warping. To measure the amount of
residual attribute-information in sensor data, we chose4 k-Nearest
Neighbors (k-NN) with Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [13]. We
aim to verify whether a different algorithm will also fail to guess
gender, even when adversaries get access to the entire time-series,
and not just a section of it. To this end we build an n × n matrix
Dl , where n is the number of subjects in the dataset. For each
activity al ∈ {downstairs,upstairs,walkinд, joддinд}, letdl (i, j) be
the distance between the time-series of usersui anduj calculated by
FastDTW [13]. Then, we calculate the final distancematrix D as the
element-wise average of all the matrices Dl ; d(i, j) = 14
∑
l dl (i, j).
We calculate distance matrices D and Dˆ for the original time-
series and the transformed series (the output of the Guardian) re-
spectively. Then we compare the ability of the estimation based on
these matrices. For each user ui ; i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} (one out-of-sample),
we estimate the value of each attributeva (ui );a ∈ {дender ,aдe,weiдht ,heiдht},
using distance weighted k-NN based on matrixD, where the weight
is:
w(i, j) = 1
d(i, j)2 .
Figure 3 shows that the estimation error for gender classification
approaches that of a random estimator after transformation. In this
Figure, the error of a random estimator for gender is NfNf +Nm =
10
24
4k-NN with DTW outperforms other methods in time-series classification, except
when considerable computation and implementation cost is acceptable for very small
improvements [1].
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Figure 4: Dependencies between height and gender on the
MotionSense and MobiAct datasets. A classification thresh-
old of 172cm predicts gender with 84% accuracy.
and for the rest of attributes is considered as the half of the variation
interval in dataset; e.g. 190−1612 = 14.5 for height.
Thus the GEN eliminates similarities between same-gender time-
series and an attacker cannot confidently use distance measures to
make inference about gender. Interestingly, by eliminating gender
information, we also partially eliminate information on other at-
tributes, as there are dependencies between attributes. For example,
the estimation error for height and weight increases by near 25%
and 20%, respectively.
Height is indeed highly correlated with gender in both datasets
(Figure 4): the prediction accuracy of gender-based on height only
is 81%. However, gender prediction from both datasets using the
MTCNN architecture is considerably better than that.
Using Supervised Learning. We explore learning gender dis-
criminative features from transformed data. Figure 5 shows the
training and validation accuracy of activity recognition and gen-
der classification using supervised learning on transformed data.
Gender-discriminative features in the transformed data are rare,
even with a large number of epochs as in this experiment. GEN
eliminates gender-related features and thus makes it is difficult for
a classifier to train on them even when it has access to the labels of
transformed data.
Although, with experiments in this section, we have shown an ac-
ceptable efficiency in eliminating sensitive information, it is highly
desired to statistically prove the efficiency of the proposed solution.
Generally, high temporal granularity of time-series and strong cor-
relation between their samples make this task very challenging. We
leave exploring this area to future research.
5 RELATEDWORK AND DISCUSSION
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) [7] learn to capture the sta-
tistical distribution of data for synthesizing new samples from the
learned distribution. In the GANs a discriminator model learns to
determine whether a sample is from themodel distribution (i.e. from
the generator) or from the data distribution (i.e. from a real-world
source). The discriminator aims to maximize an objective function
in minimax game that the generator aims to minimize. GANs have
also been applied for enhancing privacy [9, 14]. For example, to
protect health records, synthetic medical datasets can be published
instead of the real ones using generative models training on sensi-
tive real-world medical datasets [3, 6]. To provide a formal privacy
Activity Recognition (Training)
Activity Recognition (Validation)
Gender Classification (Training)
Gender Classification (Validation)
100%
95%
90%
85%
80%
75%
70%
65%
60%
55%
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
Figure 5: Activity and gender classification accuracy, on the
MotionSense dataset in Trial setting, when the Estimator is
trained on transformed data produced by the Guardian. Al-
though activity-features can be easily learned, there is no
useful discerning information about gender.
guarantee, [2] trains GANs under the constraint of differential pri-
vacy [5] to protect against common privacy attacks.
Although the architecture of our proposed framework looks
similar to GANs, there are key structural and logical differences
with other existing frameworks. First, the focus of existing works
is mainly on protecting users’ privacy against membership attack
by releasing a synthetic dataset through differential privacy con-
straints. Instead, we consider a situation where a user wants to
grant third parties access to sensor data that can be used to make
both sensitive and non-sensitive inferences.
Second, the generator in GANs seeks to learn the underlying
distribution of the data to produce realistic simulated samples from
random vectors. Instead, the Guardian in GEN seeks to partition the
underlying features of the data to reconstruct privacy-preserving
outputs from real-world input vectors.
Finally, the minimax game in GANs is a two-player game be-
tween generator and discriminator (i.e. two models) that updates
weights of both models in each iteration. Instead the minimax objec-
tive of GEN is a trade-off between utility and privacy that updates
the weights of one only model (i.e. the guardian) in each iteration.
Previous works on data collected from embedded sensors of per-
sonal devices, such as [11, 12], consider temporal inferences on
different activities over time (i.e. some sections of time-series corre-
sponding to non-sensitive activities and some of them to sensitive
ones). In this paper, for the first time, we concurrently consider both
activity and attribute inferences on the same section of time-series.
Our framework is applicable in distributed environments: we
have shown that the Estimator can be trained remotely (e.g. on a
powerful system and with a large dataset) and edge devices just
need to download the resulting trained model to use it as the Estima-
tor part of their locally implemented GEN under user’s control. For
example, the Guardian can be trained in user side using individuals’
personal data processing platforms, like Databox [8].
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6 CONCLUSION
We proposed the GEN framework for locally transforming sensor
data on mobile edge devices to respect functions and requirements
of an application as well as user privacy. We evaluated the efficiency
of the trade-off between utility and privacy GEN provides on real-
world datasets of motion data.
Open questions to be explored in future work include providing
theoretical bounds on the amount of sensitive information leakage
after transformation and exploring dependencies between different
attributes, e.g. co-dependence of gender and height. Finally, we
will measure the costs and requirements for running GEN on edge
devices.
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